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THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FACTOR IN
LEGAL INTERPRETATION*:
AN INTRODUCTION

Roscoe Pound t

W

E MAY think of the task of the legal order as one of maintaining the inner order of a politically organized society. The
term "law" is not uncommonly used to include the task and the agencies
by which we endeavor to achieve it. Thus it is used ( as by sociologists
and by the historical jurists) for all social control, and, by those who
limit the term to a highly specialized social control through politically
organized society, for ( r) the legal order, the regime of adjusting
relations and ordering conduct by systematic employment of the force
of a state ( the type of social control which has become paramount since
the sixteenth century) ; ( 2) the body of authoritative or received
grounds of or guides to determination by which judges and administrative officials are expected to and on the whole do carry on their
task of adjusting relations and ordering conduct through deciding disputes; and (3) the judicial and administrative processes. Interpretation, as the term is commonly used, refers to finding grounds of decision
in law in the second sense and applying them in law in the third sense.
It is not easy for the Anglo-American lawyer, much as our law
has been affected by doctrine and system of the modern Roman law,
to appreciate to the full the prolific literature as to interpretation which
has grown up since the rise of the theory of free finding of law and in
particular since the epoch-making work of Geny. The most that I can
do by way of introduction to the interesting monograph of Sr. Silveira
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is to point out how his problem and his exposition of it appeal to the
different mode of juristic thought in which English and North American lawyers have been brougp.t up. Interpretation has a narrower
meaning to the Anglo-American lawyer than it has to a lawyer brought
up in the atmosphere of the modern Roman law. We may say that
decision of a case according. to law involves (I) finding a ground of
decision in the body of authoritative grounds of or guides to decision
(law in the second sense); ( 2) if the ground of decision found is an
authoritative text, ascertainment of its meaning or giving it a meaning;
(3) applying to the facts of the case the ground of decision as found
and given meaning. This traditional analysis of the judicial process
into finding the facts and then finding, interpreting, and applying the
appropriate legal precept, grew out of academic exposition and application of the Corpu~ Juris. The tribunal was to find the appropriate
text of the Digest, find the meaning of the text, and apply it to the case
in hand. We know today that it is an over-simplification of the actual
process. But it will serve to bring out a significant difference in technique between the modern Roman law and codes based upon it or
drawn in its spirit and Anglo-American law. In Anglo-American law
the grounds of decision are to be found in statutes or in· reported judicial decisions. If the text of a statute prescribes an applicable precept,
it is to be interpreted and applied. But "interpreted" here means a
finding out of the meaning of a postulated law-!Ilaker analogous to the
sovereign lawmaker of the Eastern Roman empire, having a will the
content of which is discoverable and to be discovered. It need not be
said that this postulate is by no means in accord with reality. But it is
workable in the common-law system because of the nature of AngfoAmerican legislation, the form of our law and the technique of finding
'applicable precepts therein. In that system a statute provides rules
only. That is, it provides for definite detailed legal consequences which
are to .attach to definite detailed sets of facts. The statute is not like an
article of a code, which may be used as a starting point for judicial
reasoning. Except as a statute provides a rule, recourse is had to the
body of judicial decision, either to find one covering the case exactly
or to .find a starting point of reasoning-a principle. We do not call
this process of finding the law in the reported decisions interpretation.
It is true the process of finding an applicable precept by analogical development of the text of a code and that of analogical development of
a precept from the body of reported decisions is at bottom the same.
But as we do not use statutory texts in this way and our codifying
statutes are in the main declaratory of the common law and are eked
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out by reference to the decided cases, the process of interpretin! a
statutory text and of deriving a principle from the authoritative decisions seem quite distinct. It is only where a judicial decision or a uniform course of judicial decision do no more than fix a rule for a definite detailed state of facts that the process would be comparable to our
technique of finding a ground of decision in a statute.
Law in the second of the three senses above noted is made up of
precepts, technique, and authoritative or received ideals. Interpretation, in the wider sense, is determined by this ideal element of a legal
system. The received ideals are, as it were, pictures of the end of the
legal order by which the finding, application, and development of legal
precepts are guided or even determined. What may lead us to be
skeptical as to this is the extreme view sometimes urged as to the effect
to be given to the ideal element. Thus when Duguit argues that the
ideal of social solidarity is to be given effect over any text of the law
we are given pause. But he is there giving us a proposition of natural.
law. If his ideal were the authoritative, received ideal of the time and
place, interpretation and application of the text would be found to be
shaped by it, or even, as in totalitarian regimes, the text would be
superseded by it.
In Anglo-American law, where starting points for reasoning are
found by working out the presuppositions of decided cases, the narrow
view of interpretation, as having to do only with the text of statutes
laying down rules for definite states of fact but not affording a basis
by analogy for deciding cases not within the four corners of their text,
was well enough until in the United States this technique had to be applied to constitutional texts under conditions of change of received
ideals in the transition from a pioneer, rural, agricultural to an urban,
industrial society in the present century. Much the same problem is
raised with respect to our eighteenth-century bills of rights, declared to
be the supreme law of the land, as is raised by century-old codes in the
domain: of the modern Rom~tn law. But our technique of finding
· grounds of decision in the reported cases where the legislative text
leaves any gap, has delayed recognition of what we have to face.
Moreover, we are not 'troubled by something which has embarrassed
interpretation in-Continental Europe. In Anglo-American law there
was no place for a doctrine of a complete system of legislation in which
every case was provided for, if not by express provision then by an
authoritative basis for logical development of the required precept.
With us legislation has not purported to be complete beyond furnishing definite detailed provisions for definite detailed situations of fact.
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Beyond this, principles, authoritative starting points for judicial reasoning, have been found in the law reports-in the reported course of
judicial decision.
At one time some attack was made on the traditional common-law
· technique of finding grounds of deciding new questions by reasoning
fyom the reported cases. An extreme analytical view of the separation
of powers was vouched for a proposition that the judges had no power
of finding precepts for new cases by reasoning from the analogy of
decided cases; that they must find an applicable rule already established
by a statute or a rule established by some authoritative precedent, and
apply it mechanically. Otherwise, it was urged, the case must await
legislative action. The last gasp of this attack on our common-law
technique was in a memorial addressed to the New York Constitutional
Convention in l 9 l 2 by a small group of lawyers.
' In the United States the separation of powers is a constitutional
. distribution of authority not a juristic dogma. It has its roots in the
. history of colonial British America, and was put in all our constitutions,
federal and state, as a result of experience of the concentration of
power in the home government before the American Revolution.
Hence its application in our constitutional law has tended to be historical. The powers of the crown, of Parliament (before 1688), and of
the courts as they were in England at the time of colonization, with a
reservation that powers of doubtful classification were assignable to an
appropriate department by legislation, has made the constitutional provisions reasonably workable in practice.
Influence of politics upon the body of authoritative grounds of or
guides to decision in matters of adjusting relations and ordering conduct in the everyday life of men in society has hardly been what the
political interpretation would lead us to expect. French law has a
continuity from before the Revolution. The ordinances of the French
kings of the old regime and the writings of Pothier gave the contents
of the French Civil Code. The common law of England, as Coke had
laid it down in the fore part of the seventeenth century determined the
law of England after the Revolution of 1688 and maintained itself in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The same common law of
England, as it was before the American Revolution, continued after
that Revolution and obtains today in all but one of our states. The
influence of politics has been upon the ideal element of t4e law and so
upon the background of interpretation and application.
There was in the Anglo-American legal system no public law as the
modern Roman law understood that term. In Blackstone's Commen-
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taries ( r 76 5) the law as to public officers was put as a branch of private
law-that part of the law of persons which had to do with persons
invested with governmental authority subject to the law of the land
as all persons were in their several activities. We are having to revise
our ideas in face·-of the change from a pioneer, rural, agricultural society to an urban, industrial society. But that change has gone on at
varying rates in different parts of the United States and is by no means
complete for the whole country. Its effect upon interpretation is.
chiefly as to interpretation and application of constitutional texts and
as to them raises much of the sort of questions to which Sr. Silveira
addresses himself. With us, there was at first an idea of the end of law
as securing the reasonable expectations (rights) of individuals as "natural rights." Later, there was an idea of the end of law as making
possible a maximum of free individual self-assertion. This was the idea
of the metaphysical jurist-s of Continental Europe in the last century.
Other ideas not so clearly worked out have been urged of late. One
which has been most clearly put and vigorously urged is that the end
of law is simply to maintain the social order by securing the political or
the economic order of the time and place. boes not Sr. Silveira'.s question get down to one of the influence of the received ideal of the end
of the legal order upon the judicial and administrative processes in the
way in which they apply law in the sense of the body of received or
established grounds of or guides to decision?
Rise of administrative tribunals as an incident of development of
the idea of the state as an institution for service rather than merely an
agency of maintaining the general security is requiring us to rethink
many points on which our Anglo-American juristic ideas had become
settled. This is especially notable as to our fundamental doctrine of
supremacy of law.
Nothing need be said nowadays of the idea of a slot machine administration of justice; put the facts in the slot, pull a lever, and pull
out the pre-appointed decision. There was a vain endeavor in the nineteenth ceritury in all systems to make the judicial process conform to
this theory. A not unnatural reaction has been calling for a turning of
the judicial process entirely at large; for substituting the personal,
subjective standard of the individual judge guided at most by a general
notion of the .public good. But the mechanical theory had the public
good in view. Its proponents believed that the public good consisted
in maintaining individual liberties. Exactly in what the public good is
to be taken to exist as men think today is not easy to say. Often it seems
as if the self-styled realists assume it to be absolute power of officials for
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its own sake instead of absolute freedom of individual action for its own
sake. At any rate, in recent political absolutism the ideal is not officials
governing according to law, which has been the ideal of Anglo-American law, but officials governing through Jaw. It conceives of law as the
instrument of official action, not as the guide of official action.
Under totalitarian regimes, while the judge is by no means independent in the Anglo-American sense, yet in another sense he is in appearance wholly free·. He is to act according to discretion, not by
applying binding precepts. It is significant that this has been much
urged in lands which are by no means totalitarian in their politics. This
phenomenon is nothing new. In legal history there has been a pretty
constant movement back and forth between rule and discretion; between a quest of certainty and uniformity, with an eye to the social interest in the general security, and a quest of individualization with an
eye to the social interest in the individual life. The difficulty of keeping
the two in balance has been perennial. Here Radbruch's ·idea of irreducible antinomies is significant. Neither can be carried out to complete
logical development. When this is done with respect to one it negates
the other. But it does not follow that we must make a final choice of
one or the other and carry it out to its fullest extent. This has been
tried more than once and has never succeeqed. No matter how hard
men have tried they have never been able to exclude either wholly
from the administration of justice. It may be that, as Radbruch argues,
we cannot unify the two. But we can and must keep them in a balance
which will give each a real place. To speak after the fashion of the
moment, the public good is not wholly identified with either. It includes both and is to be achieved in terms of both kept in a balance
which allows as much to each as is compatible with the other.
It should be- added 'that in the totalitarian state the discretion allowed the judge was subjected to official interpretations and special
directions which reflected the discretion of the head of the state. A sort
of official natural law was sought
to be set up; "an unwritten law which
1
evolves from the soul of the people." As Sr. Silveira suggests, it is comparable to Savigny's V olksueberzeugung with the ethical element left
·out. But the organ through which this soul of the people was expressed
was the political organization-those who wielded the authority of the
politically organized society. In these regimes there was a caricature of
law rather than law.

